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Empirical evidence shows that innovative firms are often more constrained in obtaining
external funds than less innovative firms. Explanations are based on the uncertain
outcome and high costs of R&D effort. When providing credit, the lender assesses the
creditworthiness of the borrower. She relies on financial data and market analysis. The
financial data analysis reveals costs and the market outlook is linked to the uncertainty
of future profitability. In this paper we examine whether the credit assessment behaviour
of banks hurts firms of a more innovative sector more and how this affects long term
innovative success and economic development. We use an evolutionary approach à la
Nelson and Winter but with two sectors. A bank provides credit and supplies it to single
firms based on a rating. We illuminate the impact of rating process characteristics on the
long term outcome. When the bank does not distinguish for sector-specific features, such
as risk and market outlook, the high-tech sector benefits over-proportionally because the
surviving firms have a high profitability and further innovations are more likely. The way
that the bank forms expectations about the market outlook influences the allocation
of credit between sectors. The innovative sector is supplied more credit if the market
outlook is assessed in a rather conservative fashion. The impact on aggregates however,
is limited because the bank uses other pieces of information as well.
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1 Introduction
Firms suffer from discrimination in access to credit (Canepa and Stoneman, 2008; Hao and
Jaffe, 1993; Giudici and Pateari, 2000). This pattern of constraints can reinforce distur-
bances in the selection process. For example, those firms that are less profitable and less
innovative are expected to grow at a comparatively low rate or to exit the market under
an efficient mechanism in place. This is however, not observed in an Italian sample when
there are financial constraints (Bottazzi et al., 2006, 2014; Bottazzi et al., 2010). Public
subsidies can remedy constraints as they not only help most those firm in dire need of ex-
ternal funding (Hyytinen and Toivanen, 2003) but also increase the trust in creditworthiness
by others and thus may enable external financing in the future (Takalo and Tanayama, 2010).
The aim of the paper is to explore which role the determinants of lender behaviour play in
the evolution of a diversified economy. Therefore, we employ a rating process that determines
the credit supply for each individual firm of two sectors. We examine the role of weights put
on various pieces of information used for the rating like cash flow or market share. We also
examine the impact of different ways of expectation formation about the prospects of the
sectors.
We ask first what is the impact of the bank routines for credit supply on innovation and
technology diffusion? The focus is on gaining insight about the dynamic of the bank de-
cision in response to risk and furthermore in response to rather optimistic or conservative
expectation formation.
In order to grasp insights we consider the following more detailed questions: to what extent
does the bank policy determine whether one of the two sectors benefits? And which effect
does the funding of the more innovative sector have on the low-tech sector?
We use a two-sector approach in order to bundle firms in an innovative and in an less
innovative sector. We call the more innovative sector ’high-tech’ and the less innovative one
’low-tech’. Banks that use internal rating/ scoring systems evaluate the creditworthiness of a
firm in comparison to its rivals. Therefore, even if a firm does better than all firms in another
sector, it might still be seen as an under-performing entity. The particular importance that
the bank puts on sector-specific and economy-wide indicators in measuring creditworthiness
may lead to different economic dynamics.
Innovation is subject to sufficient funding of the R&D effort. However, firms are con-
strained in financing R&D for several reasons. Explanations are based on the information
shortage of external financiers compared to the firm. This disadvantage leads credit or eq-
uity providers to require a higher risk premium. Furthermore, even if R&D leads to some
innovation that can be implemented, it does not yield tangible assets that can serve as col-
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lateral for a loan. This also contributes to the risk premium (Mohnen et al., 2008; Czarnitzki
and Hottenrott, 2011). Furthermore, the outcome of R&D projects is highly insecure and
monitoring them is costly. Therefore, firms might not be able to be granted credit for R&D
to the amount they would like to (Freel, 2007). For a United Kingdom data-based empirical
study, Freel (2007) finds that small firms that are innovative actually experience less credit
granting success than their less innovative competitors. In a sample of US and UK small
and medium-sized enterprises [SMEs] more innovative firms face a higher probability of not
being financed externally although they are not more likely to apply for it (Mina et al., 2013).
Supportive findings concerning high-tech firms are provided by Guiso (1998) who uses Italian
samples where cross-sectional data shows that manufacturers in high-tech categories have a
higher probability of being constrained in credit. The explanation refers to higher uncertainty
related to producing at the edge of technology.
Furthermore, it is reported that the availability of external finance is more constrained for
very innovative firms, more precisely, the relation between innovative ability and access to
credit is inversely u-shaped (Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2004). This is supported by the evidence
mentioned above that considers sub samples of firms that are more likely to be constrained,
namely small and medium enterprises and young firms. Because those lack either collateral
and/or a proven history of creditworthiness, their ability to pay back a loan is highly un-
certain. The effects constraints have are less that projects are not carried out to the full
extent but rather that they are not started at all (Mancusi and Vezzuli, 2010). Constraints
in external funding affect R&D efforts of firms in the first place (Brown et al., 2009; Mohnen
et al., 2008). Aghion et al. (2005, 2012) find that credit rationing influences the R&D
policy of French firms where the effect depends on the degree to which firms are financed
externally. Explanations range from fluctuations in R&D spending that are due to lack of
financial institutions (Hyytinen and Toivanen, 2003) to higher costs of external capital as
identified in Dutch samples (Mohnen et al., 2008), Italian manufacturing samples (Mancusi
and Vezzuli, 2010), French manufacturing firms (Savignac, 2007), and US vs. European
samples (Ravera and Canet, 2001).
Ben-Zion (1984) mentions that research investment increases in economically favourable
times and Yildizoglu (2002) points out that firms who do not experience success of R&D
after a while tend to abandon research activities. Also high competition among firms leads
to lower R&D. For firms, 50% of spending on R&D is due to high wages for knowledge
workers (Brown et al., 2012). Therefore, “[f]irms tend to smoothen R&D investment over
time in order to avoid having to lay off knowledge workers.” (Hall and Lerner, 2009, p.5).
Firms try to mitigate their dependence on outside funding by building up cash reserves which
allow them to smoothen R&D activity over time. Brown et al. (2009) find that an improved
supply of equity can trigger an R&D boom because relatively young firms benefit from that.
Consequently, a lack of equity supply also can lead to a bust in R&D activity as the R&D
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cycle in the U.S. in the 1990s showed. Moreover, firms that have a high R&D intensity suffer
comparatively more from constraints because they usually require relatively higher external
funding (Piga and Atzeni, 2007).
Bank credit is the major source of external financing (Hall and Lerner, 2009). Banks
across the world need to provide a rating for their debtors according to the Basel II agree-
ment. They can do ratings on their own (internal rating) or rely on external ratings provided
by rating agencies (European Parliament, 2006). In fact, for granting credit to SMEs in Eu-
rope, banks use mostly internal rating systems (Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services
[CSES], 2014). There are many commonalities between internal and external ratings and
external ratings are usually used for large companies above a particular threshold of market
value. The crucial differences between pieces of information used for rating are whether they
are of quantitative or qualitative nature. Quantitative information can be extracted from
financial statements such as the balance sheet. Those pieces of information are backward-
looking. Although the probability of default (of repayment) is the crucial figure to estimate,
banks do rely mostly on heuristic methods to assess that probability, even if there are also
statistical and causal analytical methods, like models of option pricing. One reason is that
statistical methods are only meaningful if the data set is sufficiently large (Reichling et al.,
2007, p. 55). In order to assess the likelihood of credit repayment, a forward looking ap-
proach is necessary: “[a]ssessing an obligor’s resources for fulfilling its financial commitments
is primarily a forward-looking exercise.”(Standard and Poor’s, 2011, p. 5.) Moreover, “[a]n
assessment that only includes the present must not be decisive - the [firm’s] focus on the
orientation to the future must be satisfactory.” (Kremer and ten Hoevel, 1989, p. 122.)
The prospect requirement is also an explicit demand of the European Union for internal
rating methods to be approved: “[i]nformation shall be current and shall enable the credit
institution to forecast the future performance of the exposure.” (European Parliament, 2006,
Annex VII, Part 4, Paragraph 18.) An important part in the assessment of creditworthiness
is the evaluation of the market growth, because that represents the prospect of the particular
industry the firm does business in (Reichling et al., 2007; Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2004). This
can usually only be achieved by assessing the available information qualitatively. For evalu-
ating European SMEs, the reportedly most important pieces of information are management
quality, project quality or market sector (CSES, 2014). Usually, banks use 20-40% of qual-
itative information and the rest quantitative while for banks specialized in servicing SMEs
the share of qualitative information may be in the range of 60-80% (CSES, 2014). There
are however, differences in rating models in terms of which model is used for processing the
information into a default probability. For an overview, refer to Crouhy et al. (2000) who
report different approaches from four private companies or Reichling et al. (2007) who give
an overview about the pieces of information used by banks and rating agencies.
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This paper contributes to explaining empirical findings about financial constraints and
innovation by assessing the role of bank routines on financing constraints and heterogeneity
found in constraints. By modeling bank routines in an evolutionary framework it provides
one possible explanation of observed phenomena, for example that highly innovative firms
being even more restricted. The model builds upon literature about risk management and
R&D behaviour and on the theoretical approach of innovation embedded in an evolutionary
context.
The model is set in a dynamic agent based framework building on the work of Nelson and
Winter (1982) and Winter (1984) which is designed in an evolutionary environment under
Schumpeterian competition. In each period the bank uses information about the firms in
order to determine how much credit it would be willing to lend to each of them. It has
a particular routine of doing so by relying on the assessment of creditworthiness based on
multiple features. There are two sectors and each firm produces and conducts R&D to some
extent. The outcome is some quantity of a homogenous good in each sector which jointly
with all other firms in the sector determines the market price. Also the profit of each firm is
determined automatically on the one hand. On the other hand the R&D effort might lead to
the finding of a better technology which the successful firm can use in the production process
of the next period. This leads the successful firm to wanting to invest more for the next
round of production. However, this possibility depends on the current profit and available
credit. If the firm can exploit that technological improvement it will have better access to
credit in the next period.
There are two feedback effects employed in the model: a better technology improves access
to credit and access to credit improves the probability of finding a better technology. Both
effects are however, subject to individual behaviour of both, the bank and the firms. Thus,
the effectiveness of the feedback varies in the behavioural routine of the agents. The bank
uses information that applies in comparison to all other firms and it uses pieces of information
that are sector-specific like market share. Furthermore, the bank needs to form expectations
if it wants to assess the prospects of the respective industry.
Results indicate that the more the bank supplies credit based on information distinguished by
sector the less innovation and output growth will take place. The reason is that innovative
firms cannot benefit to the full extent from their superior productivity. That is, their success
is recognized only with respect of their sector and not economy-wide and therefore they
cannot gain as much from their advantage.
Furthermore, the way that the bank forms expectations about productivity only matters
when all other pieces of information for the rating decision are taken into account in a
rather marginal way. If they are of some importance it almost does not matter how the
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bank asserts the future productivity because the magnitude is too low. Predominantly,
expectations are overshadowed by information about current cash flow and survival ratios
in an industry. Nevertheless, the expectations have an impact on the shifting of credit
between the sectors. The positive impact of higher average productivity growth however,
does lead to a shift of funds to the other sector. The reason is that more trend-following
expectations also exhibit more short-term variation as they follow the current and ever-
changing trend. This trend is more short-lived and works in both directions as occasionally
high growth will hardly be sustained in the next period. If the expectations focus more on
the long-term average occasionally high growth has a more persistent impact. Therefore,
under conservative expectations, the bank shifts more funds to the more successful sector in
the long run.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces the model and
section 3 establishes a baseline case. In section 4 the impact of the rating procedure on the
sectoral evolution is examined. In section 5 we discuss the role of expectations on the bank’s
decision and the possible impact in this framework. Section 6 concludes.
2 Setup
Output Q is generated by technology A and capital K by each firm i at each period t:
Qit = AitKit . (1)
There are two sectors I and J, where I is considered to be a low-tech sector and J is considered
to be a high tech sector. Total output per sector is equivalent to demand in each sector
DI ≡∑Qit ∀i ∈ I (2)
DJ ≡∑Qit ∀i ∈ J. (3)
We assume that the goods are completely non-rival such that demand for each good is
independent of the other sector. The inverse demand function determines the price
PI,t =
DI
∑i Qit
, ∀ i ∈ I (4)
PJ,t =
DJ
∑i Qit
, ∀ i ∈ J. (5)
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Capital is subject to depreciation at rate δ and investment I.
Ki(t+1) = I
(
PtAi(t+1)
c
,sit ,piit ,δ
)
Kit +(1−δ )Kit (6)
A firm’s desired investment is determined by the ratio of price to production cost Pt ·Ait+1
c
or,
equivalently, the percentage margin over cost, the depreciation rate δ and its market share
sit . A firm’s ability to finance its investment is constrained by its profitability. Profitability
piit is determined by the productivity cost difference per unit of capital and the spending on
last periods loan, which is determined by the interest rate i and the loan per unit of capital
lit−1 taken in the last period by the firm:
piit =


PI,tAit − c− iit−1lit−1, ∀ i ∈ I
PJ,tAit − c− iit−1lit−1, ∀ i ∈ J.
(7)
Firms try to obtain better technology. They spend some amount ΦitKit on R&D. The prob-
abilities of finding (drawing) new technologies are determined by imitation and innovation
respectively and depend positively on the firm size, i.e. the amount of capital, some positive
factor aim,ain, and the usage of R&D spendings ΦitKit
Prob(dim = 1) = 1− e
−aimKit Φit κit
Prob(din = 1) = 1− e
−ainKit Φit (1−κit ) (8)
where κit is the share that determines the allocation of funds to imitation.
1 Assume that
a firm does either imitation search or innovation search only. This depends on whether it
actually employs the best technology already or whether it uses less efficient technology.
The rationale is that a technology leader has nothing to copy from and can thus devote all
financial means of research to innovative search.2 Firms with less efficient technology would
then strictly search any possibility to copy existing technology. This is a drastic statement
but also very simple. A precondition is that there is common knowledge about the highest
technology.3 Let AˆIt , AˆJt be the best technology of the respective sector. The choice of
1These probabilities are inspired by Dosi et al. 2011.
2The particular role both, innovation and imitation play in economic growth is subject to a lot of discussion and
research. While innovation breaks ground to better techniques, the diffusion of this techniques as firms reorganize
usually leads to the real push in economic activity. See for example, Fagerberg and Verspagen (2002) for some
discussion.
3Other models employ a more sophisticated and incremental choice between imitation and innovation effort which
then does not require common knowledge. See, for instance, Colombo et al. (2012).
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R&D investment policy also is depending on the sector such that
κit =


0, if AˆI,t = Ait , ∀ i ∈ I
0, if AˆJ,t = Ait , ∀ i ∈ J
1, else.
(9)
Each firm may conduct some R&D in a period. This is a two stage process where it first
may or may not draw an innovation or imitation. In case of drawing an imitation the firm
adopts the industry’s best technology. Successful draws are indicated by
χ im,init =


1, if there is a successful draw of imitation (im) or innovation (in),
0, else.
If the firm draws an innovation, it gets a sample from a distribution of technical opportunities
determined by F(A˜it ;Ait) where A˜it ∼ LogNormal(Ait ,1). This implies that any innovation
that is found is actually better than the currently employed technology. The technology that
a firm can use in the next period is the best technology available to that firm. That is, it
is the best technology among the current individual technology, the best technology in the
sector if an imitation was drawn or the innovation that was drawn
Ai(t+1) =


Max(Ait , AˆI,t χ imit , A˜it χ
in
it ), ∀ i ∈ I
Max(Ait , AˆJ,t χ imit , A˜it χ
in
it ), ∀ i ∈ J.
(10)
Given the anticipated technology of the upcoming production round a firm demands capital
investment according to the functions
Idit = 1+ δ −
µit
Pt Ai(t+1)
c
(11)
µit =
ϕ − (ϕ −1)sit
ϕ −ϕsit
. (12)
where µit is the markup power a firm could exert. This markup consists of some positive
parameter ϕ and the current market share of a firm sit . The higher the market share,
the higher is the markup (Winter, 1984, p. 319). The investment demand then depends
negatively on the markup and positively on the price-over-cost margin of the firm. Firms
determine their R&D effort according to prior success of research and in boom times the
firms tend to increase R&D. Denoting Φit the per unit of capital R&D spending of a firm i
at t, the firm changes R&D spending according to the factor Ωit . Desired spending on R&D
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is
Φ
d
it = Max
[
Φit−1(1+Ωit),b
RD
]
(13)
with
Ωit = λ
F(piit−1−piit−T−1) (14)
where T is the number of past periods taken into account and Ωit determines the change in
R&D demand. Assuming that firms adapt their target R&D spending by reacting positively
on profit changes, λ F > 0 is a parameter of the adjustment speed. Furthermore, bRD > 0
represents a basic R&D target which the firm always wants to conduct. This behavioural rule
is intended to capture increases in R&D spending in economically favourable times (Ben-
Zion, 1984) and the reducing of R&D activity if the firm’s success decreases or if competition
is too tight which reduces profitability (Yildizoglu, 2002). Note that there will be always a
non-zero level of desired R&D This feature does not completely match with the statement
of Yildizoglu (2002) which indicates that firms without R&D success will abandon research
completely. Note also that, compared to the Nelson-Winter approach it is just profit and
savings that determine investment possibilities.
Together with R&D demand Φdit the firm has demand for expenditures E
d
it = Φ
d
it + I
d
it . Denote
Cit = piit + Sit−1/Kit − lit−1 as liquidity per unit of capital. It consists of profitability and
accumulated savings minus the last periods credit that has to be repaid. By assuming a
strict hierarchy in financing, a firm would first use profit to finance investment and then
refer to its savings. If investment demand exceeds liquidity there is demand for additional
cash in the form of credit. Credit demand is the difference needed for financing
ldit =


Edit −Cit for Cit < E
d
it
0 else.
(15)
The average credit supply per unit of capital ls is assumed to be constant. Total credit
supply in absolute terms is lst = l
s ·∑i Kit . Given its capital share in the economy the per unit
of capital credit supply for any firm is ex ante l
s
t
Kit
.
The bank supplies credit by distinguishing the two sectors via setting the weight factor λ st .
This applies via ωit
ωit =


λ st , for i ∈ I
(1−λ st ), for i ∈ J.
(16)
The bank supplies credit to individual firms by ranking them according to their profitability
8
and their market share. This represents the rating process in this model. The relative
importance of profitability and market share is determined by setting λ ∈ [0,1]. The credit
supply rule that the bank applies is
lsit =


lst
Kit
(
λ piit−1
∑pi
pos
it−1
+ωit(1−λ )
Qit−1
∑ (Qit−1)
)
, for piit−1 > 0
lst
Kit
(
ωit(1−λ )
Qit−1
∑ (Qit−1)
)
, else.
(17)
This applies to both sectors, where ∑pi
pos
t−1 is the sum of all profits from firms that yielded
positive profits. Therefore, firms with positive profitability get credit supplied according to
their relative position in the set of all profitable firms. This specification hence avoids some
potential problems for the case that -due to negative profits- some firms’ profits are huge
relative to the average profit. Thus, the bank takes into account relative profitability and
relative technology level. This also means that total credit supply, lst , is not necessarily used
completely as firms with negative profit are only offered a share computed by (1−λ ) times
the market share.
The parameter λ st shows the weight the bank puts on each sector. This weight may
be adaptive and depend on the expected return, possibly through the survival and thus
repayment rate, from each sector. If the sectors are different, then the expected return can
be very different. The allocation choice should be such that λ st ∈ [0,1]. Determine ft as the
deficit rate in a sector which expresses a proxy for non-recoverable credit
ft =
#Exitst
#Firmst
(18)
and the average over H periods
f t =
1
H
H−1
∑
h=0
ft−h (19)
in the respective industry. Choosing aλ ∈ [0,1] as an adaptation speed parameter, the bank’s
choice is made according to
λ st = Min[1, Max[0, λ
s
t−1+aλ
(
f J,t−1− f I,t−1
)
]]. (20)
If for example, the default rate in industry I is higher than in industry J, the last term is
negative and the bank shifts more credit to sector J by reducing λ s. This rule is inspired by
actual bank rating practice as reported by Reichling et al. (2007). They state that banks
classify firms in categories and then assess the risk of credit default by looking at past default
ratios of firms having been in the respective category. Since in this model, risk is accounted
for by rationing credit, less credit is supplied to the sector that is perceived to be riskier by
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the bank. The bank proxies this risk by the drop-out rate in the industry.
Some sectors of the economy are regarded to be R&D-intensive, like pharmaceuticals or the
aerospace industry (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung [DIW], 2009). Therefore,
we assume that the so-called high-tech sector J in our model is aiming at conducting a basic
level of R&D that exceeds the one of the so-called low-tech industry bRDJ > b
RD
I . We also
assume that the high-tech sector has a better chance of drawing an innovation/ imitation
given the same spending on R&D such that aim,inJ > a
im,in
I .
4 Credit is allocated among the
firms applying for it. Then,
lit = Min
[
ldit , l
s
it
]
. (21)
The investment constraint is
Icit =Cit + lit . (22)
Actual capital investment is then determined by this constraint and the desired capital in-
vestment. Actual R&D spending is furthermore determined by the amount of liquidity not
used for physical investment and the R&D desire
Iit = Min[I
c
it , I
d
it ] (23)
Φit = Min[I
c
it − Iit ,Φ
d
it ]. (24)
The firms save money not invested. Savings evolve according to:
Sit = Sit−1 +(piit + lit − Iit −Φit)Kit (25)
as in Colombo et al., (2012). Note that savings are noted as absolute numbers and cannot
be negative.
Entry takes place according to a two-stage process. First, there is exogenous activity and
thus the number of potential imitators and innovators is determined. Then, those draw a
random technology. A constant for innovation N = 0.05 and imitation M = 0.05 determines
the number of potential entrants for innovation and imitative behavior in each of the two
sectors. After drawing an individual technology, entry takes place if the potential entrant
in a sector has drawn at least the currently average technology in the sector. The other
features of the entrants like capital are then further determined randomly under a uniformly
distributed probability within the range of existing firms’ features. Assume that entrants also
apply the strategy Φini as well.
4See Marsili and Verspagen (2002) on differences between ’technological regimes’.
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The driving force of the model is the difference in technology. It determines the relative
profitability in each sector. According to an adjustment in firm sizes and therefore output
there is a decrease in the market price. This puts pressure on all other firms in the industry
and provokes selection.
If there is enough funding available, either due to retained profits or credit, a given change
in a firm’s technology triggers more pressure on the competitors if this is a very big firm.
Since output increases relatively more in this case the price is driven down significantly.
There are two channels at work in the dynamics of the model: firm size via investment and
technology via R&D. Both determine a single firms’ output and thus the overall price level
in the industry (indirect feedback).
The main mechanism in the Nelson-Winter model would lead to a steady state market
which means that the behavioural rule of investment demand has a converging effect. This
is due to the influence of the market share: the higher the market share, the less investment
is desired. Furthermore, a better technology always increases investment demand because
it always improves the price-over-cost margin, except in the monopoly case where it has
no effect. Nevertheless, the availability of credit determines how severe the positive impact
will be. This is an important feature of this model and in line with the findings of Lee
and Harrison (2001) who claim that the benefits from R&D and even innovation often are
effective after some time lag and which then influence further R&D behaviour.
3 Baseline Case
For the baseline case the bank will only regard market specific features (λ = 0). We will
first examine a situation where there is no R&D conducted whatsoever (Φd = 0). Recall the
credit supply rule
lsit =


lst
Kit
(
λ piit−1
∑pi
pos
it−1
+ωit(1−λ )
Qit−1
∑ (Qit−1)
)
, for piit−1 > 0
lst
Kit
(
ωit(1−λ )
Qit−1
∑ (Qit−1)
)
, else.
Note that according to the European Union’s requirements for rating methods to be approved,
the condition λ > 0 is sustaining in practice since “consistency shall exist across lines of
business, departments and geographic locations” (European Union, 2006, Annex VII, Part
4, Paragraph 17.(a) ) which means that comparability of all firms requires also information
that is not market specific. The other parameters in this setting are credit supply ls = 0.05
and reaction intensity on default rate aλ = 0.5. For λ
s
ini ∈ [0,1] we examine the long run
evolution of the economy. Then, we will introduce R&D. Since there is no technological
improvement in the baseline case we will only observe allocation effects as total output is
relatively constant. Furthermore, as the two sectors only differ in their R&D effort and
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success probabilities, in this baseline case they are the same. We look at economic features
after some time period contingent of λ sini. We take results of periods t ∈ [980,1000] where
the model has evolved enough in order to distinguish for different long-term influences. We
compute the average of that time span. We repeat this 100 times and take the average of
those repetitions. This is done for each of ten different levels of λ sini. Results are depicted in
figure 1.
3.1 Baseline Case Without R&D
In the baseline case it is observable that the sector that gets credit supplied in the beginning
will be supplied still in the long run (figure 1a). Furthermore, the supplied sector will have
some investment and low concentration. This is indicated by output (figure 1c) and the
Herfindahl-Index (figure 1d). Also, the number of firms is higher in that sector (figure 1e).
Without improving technology the increased number of exits due to under supply of credit
takes away capital and output. This is not offset by higher average productivity. Therefore,
the initially supplied sector is less concentrated and its output is higher.
The use of credit also increases in initial credit supply (figures 1g and 1h). However, due
to exiting firms and lower output the prices are higher for the remaining firms which leaves
those better off. They have a higher profitability and thus require less credit for financing
(figure 1f). This is indicated by total profits (figure 1b). In the simulation the low tech
sector makes negative total profits for higher λ sini. That means that it is likely that initially
supplied firms are Ponzi-financed and need to pay a lot of interest for credit which cuts into
profits. This is indicated by figure 1h. Firms in the low tech sector need furthermore an
increasing amount of credit just to pay back old credit so that credit supply induces the need
for further credit if there are no productivity gains.
Figures 2 and 3 show the dynamics over time of the economy for different initial alloca-
tion parameters. If the initial supply of credit is higher the credit supply for this sector is
comparatively higher and lower in the other sector. In both cases of initial credit supply,
the supplied sector evolves the same. A comparison of figures 2a and 3a shows that the
economy evolves the same in both cases and the sectors are just interchangeable. Therefore,
the supplied sector output is comparatively higher and at the same time, the market price
is lower. This has implications for the profitability in the sectors. The supplied sector has a
comparatively lower profitability since there are no technological improvements. This means
that at the same time its share of external funds in financing investment is high (figures 2d
and 2e as well as figures 3d and 3e) but investment itself is at a high level as well. Therefore,
there is a larger number of firms able to stay in the industry which drives down concentration
(see figures 2b and 3b or figures 2c and 3c). Heterogeneity among firm sizes occurs due to
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(a) allocation of credit (b) total profit (c) output
(d) Herfindahl Index (e) no. of firms (f) credit surplus
(g) share of credit demanded in
financing investment
(h) share of credit demanded in
serving old debt
Figure 1: Impact of initial credit allocation - baseline case
(Black → Low Tech; Blue, Dashed → High Tech)
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(a) output (b) bankruptcy rates (c) number of firms
(d) share of credit needed for in-
vestment low tech
(e) share of credit needed for in-
vestment high tech
Figure 2: Over time dynamics for baseline case without R&D and λ sini = 0
(Blue → high-tech sector)
(a) output (b) bankruptcy rates (c) number of firms
(d) share of credit needed for in-
vestment low tech
(e) share of credit needed for in-
vestment high tech
Figure 3: Over time dynamics for baseline case without R&D and λ sini = 1
(Blue → high-tech sector)
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random entry with heterogeneous firm sizes. Only the market share matters for the relative
supply of credit within the sector. Large firms therefore can drive small firms out of the
industry just because of their collateral. For the well supplied sector this is not a problem
since also the small firms have enough access to credit. The under supplied sector shows
high concentration because credit is scarce. Nevertheless, total profits are low in the supplied
sector because firms have to pay large amounts of interest for their funding which hurts prof-
itability. Therefore, credit supply sustains the number of firms in the sector but not its profits.
3.2 Baseline Case With R&D
We now ask whether the initial credit allocation has a similar impact if R&D matters (Φd > 0).
Figure 4 shows the impact of the initial allocation parameter λ sini when the high tech
sector is willing to conduct more basic R&D, bRDJ > b
RD
I and has a higher probability per
unit invested than the low tech sector as well (aim,inJ > a
im,in
I ). The high-tech sector with a
high R&D intensity is much better off when it gets supplied credit in the first place. The
output of the low-tech sector changes only marginally but the output of the high-tech sector
decreases significantly in the initial allocation of credit (figure 4a). The lack of credit also
hurts profits more in the high tech sector than its supply benefits the low-tech sector (figure
4b). Figure 4c indicates that a lack of credit is followed by a higher number of firms exiting
the industry. This has implications for the long-term allocation of credit. Since the high-tech
sector can grow because it has an initial high supply of credit, increased price pressure drives
firms out of the industry. This raises bankruptcy rates and the bank shifts away credit to the
low-tech sector (figure 4d). The number of innovations and imitations supports this view
(figures 4e and 4f). The lower sectoral profits for the high tech sector require that a higher
share of investment needs to be financed by credit as figure 4g confirms. Also, figure 4i
indicates that initial allocation of credit does not matter for credit usage if firms can improve
by conducting R&D. The share of credit needed to set off old debt is low and does not vary
in the initial allocation. There is only the exception when all credit is initially allocated to
the high-tech sector. Because the high-tech sector starts with using a lot of credit and only
diminished that usage over time when some firms improve upon technology sometimes the
ratio may be high after 1000 periods. Compare figures 5d and 6d as well.
Figure 5 shows the dynamics over time for the baseline case with R&D and initial alloca-
tion parameter λ s = 0 where the R&D intensive sector is supplied all the credit. The images
are averages taken from 10 runs. This supplied sector is able to innovate and hence increase
output (figure 5a) and the allocation parameter shifts to the low-tech sector over time (figure
5b). The reason is that the high-tech sector is exposed to many exiting firms. The shift of
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(a) output (b) total profit (c) no. of firms
(d) allocation of credit (e) no. of innovations (f) no. of imitations
(g) share of credit needed for fi-
nancing investment
(h) share of credit needed for fi-
nancing R&D
(i) share of credit needed for
serving old debt
Figure 4: Impact of initial credit allocation with R&D
(Black → Low Tech; Blue, Dashed → High Tech)
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(a) output (b) λ s
(c) share of credit needed for
serving old debt low tech
(d) share of credit needed for
serving old debt high tech
Figure 5: Over time dynamics for baseline case with R&D and λ sini = 0
(Blue → high-tech sector)
credit to the low tech sector is clearly visible in the amount that firms need to refinance old
debt (figures 5c and 5d). The low tech sector lacks credit supply but at the same time does
not need to repay any loans which would cut into profits. After a while, this changes due
to the allocation parameter of the bank and the low-tech sector needs to take a loan just to
repay old debt. The same is observed in the opposite direction for the high tech sector. It
initially has access to credit which leaves it in need of further credit for repayment. As there
is no further credit supplied, this liability vanishes as well.
Figure 6 shows why an initial high supply of credit for the low tech sector leaves the sector
being supplied even after a period of low supply. The periods when firms rely on credit to
repay old debt do match with the allocation parameter again (compare figures 6c and 6d
with 6b). The initial advantage of credit supply is more beneficial for the low tech sector
which is able to evolve more quickly compared to the high-tech sector (figure 6a). This
evolution also causes the credit to shift between sectors more quickly than in the opposite
scenario. Nevertheless, the initial advantage of full supply lets the high tech sector evolve
fast enough to be less reliant on credit. Figure 6d compared to figure 5c indicates decreasing
need to refinance old credit which confirms that view.
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(a) output (b) λ s
(c) share of credit needed for
serving old debt low tech
(d) share of credit needed for
serving old debt high tech
Figure 6: Over time dynamics for baseline case with R&D and λ sini = 1
(Blue → high-tech sector)
4 Bank Policy
The bank can affect the dynamics of the industries by the weight λ it puts on profitability.
Recall that the bank policy is inspired by risk management literature where lenders estimate
the creditworthiness of their borrower. They are giving it a rating classification number
and then base their decision on it. The effect of this policy is that the sector that is more
innovative will get relatively more credit for the better profitability of its member firms on
the one hand, but will suffer from less credit supply due to the higher drop out rate that
stems from increased competition in that sector.
Figure 7 depicts the results for an experiment of the impact of the weight on information
in the rating process fixed by the bank. The results indicated are for incremental values of
that weight λ ∈ [0,1]. The figure shows that the high tech sector prospers most in a situation
where sector specific features do not matter (λ = 1). If the bank puts nevertheless, much
weight on sector specific information (λ = 0) the evolution of both industries is slower with
the exception that the low-tech sector has higher total profits (figure 7c).
Output is affected much more for the high tech sector (figure 7a) than for the low-tech sector,
where it is almost constant. As the industry concentration increases in both industries (figure
7b), it seems that it is mostly the exit of firms that leads to lower total profits in the low -
tech sector. Although the number of exits is much higher in the high tech sector (figure 7d)
total profits increase. Also, credit surplus increases for both sectors (figure 7f). This is due
to the much higher number of innovations and imitation in the high tech sector (figures 7g
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(a) output (b) HHI (c) total profit
(d) no. of firms (e) λ s (f) credit surplus
(g) cumul innovations (h) cumul imitations
(i) share of credit needed for in-
vestment
(j) share of credit needed for
R&D
(k) share of credit needed for
paying off old debt
Figure 7: Impact of rating weights in the two sector setup
(Black → Low Tech; Blue, Dashed → High Tech)
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and 7h). The bank allocates more credit to the low-tech sector (figure 7e) which reduces
negative credit surplus due to the increased supply. The high-tech sector makes more profits
and due to less credit demand its credit surplus increases.
Furthermore, the technology gap between sectors widens and the weight put on the less
innovative sector increases in λ . This is indicated by the number of innovations and imitations
in figures figures 7g and 7h. This happens although the bank allocates more credit to the
low-tech sector. This allocation of credit induces a higher use of credit and a higher further
dependence on credit (figures 7i through 7k). Thus, the bank policy does have a distinct
influence on the evolution of the economy: as it puts more weight on global competition,
that is the profitability, it promotes the firms with the best cash flow and does not take into
account credit defaults by exiting firms. It has to be pointed out however, that the credit
supply is constant in units of capital, that is, as firms do leave the economy, credit supply in
absolute terms is lower in the next period. As firms with better cash flow are promoted, there
is more credit surplus as those firms do not require external funding. At the same time, the
firms relying on external funding are offered comparatively less. There are more bankruptcies
and a higher tendency toward monopolistic sectors. Furthermore, as λ increases, the impact
of λ s and aλ , the default quota adjustment speed becomes more negligible. Innovation
becomes more crucial since it has only a global effect. The disadvantage of innovation for a
single sector due to increased competition, increased bankruptcies, vanishes for λ = 1.
The parameter λ st is without meaning in this scenario. Figure 8 depicts the over time
dynamics for λ = 0 and figure 9 shows the dynamics if λ = 1 for an average of 10 runs. If
only market share matters (λ = 0) firms stay rather identical in each of the sectors. Further-
more, they are supplied with the same amount of credit since they all have the same market
share. Both effects reinforce each other. Both sectors can grow almost equally with slight
advantages for the high tech sector (figure 8a). The allocation parameter λ st increases a bit
(figure 8d) which is the reason that the low tech sector has access to credit and is able to
grow at about the same pace as the high tech sector. Figures 8b and 8c show that both
sectors face similar bankruptcy rates. The similar need of credit in order to finance R&D is
visible in figures 8e and 8f while figures 8g and 8h show that also the credit needed in order
to repay old debt is similar and at a low level. The high tech sector is constrained in its
growth because credit is shifted away to the low tech sector. If the bank puts all weight on
sector specific issues the bankruptcy rate information will exert its equalizing effect to the
maximum extent. If the bank puts weight on profitability only it does react on the different
levels of profitability between the high tech and the low tech sector. Figure 9 shows that the
high tech sector is able to fully benefit from its inherent advantage of a higher probability
of innovating and imitating. It grows very fast (figure 9a). The low tech sector hardly
grows as all the high tech firms are more profitable as the low tech firms and hence the low
tech sector has not much access to credit. Figures 9b and 9c indicate that in both sectors
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(a) output (b) bankruptcy rate low tech (c) bankruptcy rate high tech
(d) λ s
(e) share of credit needed for
R&D low tech
(f) share of credit needed for
R&D high tech
(g) share of credit needed for
serving old debt low tech
(h) share of credit needed for
serving old debt high tech
Figure 8: Over time dynamics for λ = 0
(Blue → high-tech sector)
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(a) output (b) bankruptcy rate low tech (c) bankruptcy rate high tech
(d) share of credit needed for
R&D low tech
(e) share of credit needed for
R&D high tech
(f) share of credit needed for
serving old debt low tech
(g) share of credit needed for
serving old debt high tech
Figure 9: Over time dynamics for λ = 1
(Blue → high-tech sector)
22
there are more bankruptcies than in the regime where λ = 0. Furthermore, also the credit
needed in financing R&D is a little bit different. While for the low-tech sector there is no
clear difference (figure 9d), the high tech sector is in increasing need of credit for R&D over
time (figure 9e). Additionally, the rate of credit needed to repay old debt is higher for both
sectors in this scenario (figures 9f and 9g). The equalizing impact of the bankruptcy rates
is without any effect here. A better technology is not punished due to credit supply in this
scenario. The high tech sector benefits from that. The remaining firms will keep up wanting
to conduct R&D which is why the share of credit needed for that increases over time. Both
sectors use credit more as it is not shifted away by the bank. Nevertheless, as the high tech
sector evolves faster those firms will be allocated most credit due to their high profitability.
This is visible in the slow evolution of the low tech sector (figure 9a).
Thus, the bank policy determines to what extent competition will impact credit supply. The
more the bank focuses on sector-specific information, that is market-share and risk, first of
all, the more similar will the evolution of both sectors be. If the bank does not distinguish
between sectors it does not take risk into account and competition across sectors is not
important. Then, the more innovative sector will attract most of credit supply because the
most innovative firms are much more profitable. Therefore, the high tech sector will be able
to evolve much faster while the low-tech sector has hardly any access to credit and thus
evolves almost not at all.
In order to check for the robustness of the results a Wilcoxon-Signed-Rank Test is con-
ducted. This non-parametric test is done for the impact of the bank policy under 50 random
market and firm policy setups for a significance level of 95%. As market conditions cannot
be influenced by the agents in this model, the focus is on policies. Furthermore, since the
impact of credit constraints is the matter of interest, the results obtained are checked for
robustness by focusing on the bank policy and comparing three levels of it. It is checked
whether the results obtained from the comparative analysis hold in broader, randomly chosen
parameter setups, that is, in a broader environment. The Wilcoxon-Signed Rank Test con-
firms the qualitative findings of this section and of the following one as well, so that those
are concluded to be robust at a 95% significance level (see appendix).
5 Market Outlook – Expectation Formation
In this section we examine the impact of different kinds of expectation formation by the bank
on the evolution of the sectors. The bank chooses how much credit to allocate to each sector
by setting λ st according to a mix of financial data and technological growth expectations.
Financial data analysis is backward looking. We want to assess the ramifications of rather
forward-looking market analyses and whether they have the potential to become self-fulfilling.
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The financial data is covered by the cash flow and the survival rates. Growth expectations aim
at forecasting the average productivity of each sector. Expectations are formed by adapting
to the history of average productivity levels of the sectors. The variation of a single parameter
in the expectation formation rule can yield outcomes for three different mindsets of the bank
affecting the rating. By changing this parameter βg over a range of negative and positive
values, a fundamental view, naive expectations and trend extrapolation are incorporated in
the simulation. A fundamental bank view prevails if βg is negative. If it is zero, there are
naive expectations and for positive values the bank follows the current trend.
The bank first computes the average growth of average productivity in each sector for a
particular period H. In more detail the average productivity of industry I at period t is
AI,t =
∑i∈I AitKit
∑i∈I Kit
(26)
The growth rate of average productivity in industry I at period t is
gI,t =
AI,t
AI,t−1
−1 (27)
The average productivity growth over a period of length H, where the current period is
included, is then
ΘI,t =
1
H
H−1
∑
h=0
gI,t−h (28)
The bank does not know the productivity of the upcoming period when it is making the
credit decision, therefore it forms the expectation
gˆt = gt +βg (gt −Θt) (29)
which applies to both sectors the same. If the adjustment speed and strategy parameter
βg = 0, the expectation is naive. The larger βg is, the more speculative is the nature of the
expectation. If βg is negative, the bank believes that the growth rate will converge to its
long-term average. Here, the term Θt can be understood as the moving average of growth
rates for the last D periods. Suppose that the bank translates their expectation about sector
I into a scoring number σ It according to
σI,t =
1
1+ e−(ξ gˆI,t )
(30)
with ξ > 0 and which assures that σ It ∈ [0,1]. This has advantages for comparing it with the
impact of the survival rates which are also between zero and one. Then, the new allocation
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rule is
λ st = Min[1, Max[0, λ
s
t−1+aλ (RI,t−1−RJ,t−1)+ bλ (σI,t −σJ,t)]] (20b)
with bλ ≥ 0.
First, we examine how much of an impact the market outlook may have. We compare
different levels of importance between bλ ∈ [0,1] for λ = 0.375 and for a conservative, mean
reverting rule of expectations βg = −1 to illuminate the effect. Results are taken from an
interval of t ∈ [980,1000] and 100 repetitions. Figure 10 shows the result for the experiment
(a) sectoral output (b) credit surplus (c) sectoral credit allocation
Figure 10: Impact of market outlook
about the importance of the market outlook. Figure 10a shows that the output for the high
tech sector increases as the bank would put more emphasis on the market outlook while the
low-tech sector would suffer from a little less output. The reason for the effect on output is
visible in figure 10b which indicates that for the high-tech sector there will be an increasing
amount of credit surplus while at the same time, credit surplus for the low tech sector will
be even more negative. The ability to produce output is directly linked to access to credit.
Figure 10c indicates the reason for the evolution of credit surplus. The allocation of credit
is more in favour for the high-tech sector as the market outlook gains importance.
This impact can actually lead to the effect that the high-tech sector will have more access
to credit while without taking market outlook into account it would not have at all. The
impact on credit supply reveals this very clearly: for market outlook not taken into account
at all (bλ = 0), the low tech sector has no surplus or shortage of credit while the high-tech
sector suffers from a clear shortage. The importance of market outlook drives a wedge into
credit surplus at the expense of the low-tech sector because the bank shifts credit to the
high-tech sector. This is a reinforcing effect since more credit means also a higher likelihood
of innovating which in return means better a market outlook.
We now ask what impact the kind of expectation formation by the banking sector has.
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Recall that it may have conservative expectations closely related to the long-term average
or that expectations may be formed in a trend-extrapolation fashion. We use ξ = 400 and
bλ = 0.35. The time span is again covered until T = 1000. The experiment is conducted for
βg ∈ [−1,2].
(a) sector parameter (b) output (c) credit surplus
Figure 11: Impact of extrapolation of banks
Figure 11 shows how the expectational mindset of the bank impacts the economy in the
long run. Results reveal that the way expectations are formed does have an impact on the
credit decision (figure 11a) but the impact on economic variables is meager (figures 11b).
Credit surplus seems to increase for the low tech sector and to decrease for the high tech
sector, but the scale is very small (figure 11c). Extrapolating the technological progress does
lead, however, to less credit being supplied to the innovative sector (figure 11a). The reason
is that increased expectations and increased credit supply for a sector does lead to higher
output and better technology. It also is followed by increased competition and industry exits.
These exits have a negative impact on further credit supply which is hence shifted away from
the innovative sector. Thus, if the bank takes the survival rates into account it is unlikely
that even very optimistic expectations lead to more credit supply for the sector in the long
run.
The figures 12 and 13 show the differences in dynamics over time for mean-reverting ex-
pectations (figure 12) and for extrapolating ones (figure 13). They illustrate the average of
10 repetitions of the simulation. The scoring points difference for expectations is visible in
figures 12b,12c and 13b,13c. If the bank has mean-reverting expectations this has a much
longer lasting impact on scoring because the average growth matters more than short term
deviations. Also, the scores are usually above the threshold of 0.5. Furthermore, if devia-
tions are extrapolated this works also the other way round after high growth rates due to
innovation are not sustained in the following periods. The long lasting scoring impact drives
market specific credit supply towards the high-tech sector (12d).
If the bank has extrapolative expectations its judgment is much more volatile and short-lived.
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(a) output (b) score low tech (c) score high tech
(d) λ s
Figure 12: Over time dynamics for mean-reverting expectations (Blue → high-tech
sector)
(a) output (b) score low tech (c) score high tech
(d) λ s
Figure 13: Over time dynamics for extrapolative expectations (Blue → high-tech
sector)
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Because growth expectations are both, highly positive and severely negative, the overall im-
pact on λ s is volatile and the parameter is slightly increasing, under huge fluctuations (figure
13d). Therefore, the impact of the survival rate is of higher weight than the market outlook
and λ s tends to shift credit to the low-tech sector over time more distinctly for βg > 0. If
the bank follows mean-reverting expectations scoring differences last longer and technology
improvements have a longer lasting impact on λ s. Therefore, the high-tech sector benefits
more from that as a larger share of credit is allocated to this sector (figures 12a and 13a).
Only mean-reverting expectations have the potential to offset the impact of bankruptcy
rates. If expectations change too quickly as in trend extrapolating scenarios there is no last-
ing expectation that can cope with increasing bankruptcy rates. The positive expectations
of the high tech sector are just not lasting long enough to exert a positive impact over the
bankruptcies triggered by competition and therefore fast changing expectations have not a
distinct effect.
Although the impact of expectations is quite visible in λ s, the composition of the credit-
worthiness judgment is such that the impact of expectations does not overshadow financial
rating. The robustness check reveals that the impact on λ s is indeed not robust (see table
3 on page 38). Variations in other parameters therefore matter a lot. In practice, financial
rating accounts for fifty to eighty-five percent of the rating outcome (Everling et al., 2009,
p. 234). Therefore, there is a visible but not significant impact of the expectations for eco-
nomic outcomes, such as output or market power in this model. Also, in reality the impact
of expectations on the long term economic pattern can be expected to be limited as far as
credit rating is concerned.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we addressed the question which role bank routines play in the pace of innovation
in an economy. We focused on rating rules that impact two different sectors via credit supply
by constraining firms in investment and R&D. In particular, technological progress enhances
productivity and output in a sector but also competition so that an increasing number of
firms may exit the industry. If the increase in productivity of the surviving firms is too low to
compensate for the loss of production by exiting firms, sectoral output decrease in average
productivity of a sector.
We build on an evolutionary model where firms in each sector compete by their productivity.
They choose how much they invest and how much to spend on R&D on top of investment.
R&D spending depends positively on the profit history. Both sectors feed back to each other,
as well as do single firms, via credit supply. The supplier provides credit according to a rating
rule and therefore firms might be constrained. We examine the impact of rating behaviour
by addressing two aspects. First, the importance a bank adjoins to either profitability or
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sector-specific information. Secondly, how expectation formation affects the credit supply.
Within the credit supply decision there are also contrary effects. The bank assesses the
prospects of any firm relative to its rivals. An individual firm may have good prospects
but if the prospects of the sector, for instance the survival rate, are low due to increased
competition the firm might be constrained in credit nevertheless.
Both aspects of the bank decision have a decisive role in a rating process that takes the
sectoral risk from competition into account. As a sectoral average productivity increases more
firms in that sector go bankrupt at the same time. Both, the weight and the way the bank
forms expectations can influence the impact of the rating procedure. The weight parameter
simply determines the impact that risk can exert on the rating decision. If the bank focuses
on cash-flow (financial information) the high-tech sector evolves much differently than the
low tech sector. It benefits much from its inherent advantages of a higher ability of finding
new technology. The low tech sector suffers from that success as the high-tech sector will
absorb almost all the credit supply.
The expectation formation of the bank is able to counterbalance the impact of the risk
assessment. If the bank has mean-reverting expectations it keeps up expecting a good
evolution of the high-tech sector for an extended period. This leads to a persistent shift of
credit to the high-tech sector. If the bank has extrapolative expectations it follows upswings
and downswings in the average productivity. Therefore there is no persistent force that can
outbalance the impact of the higher risk in the high-tech sector. Therefore, credit is shifted
gradually to the low tech sector and differences between sectors are less pronounced.
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Parameters and Variables
Parameters
Demand low-tech sector DI 40
Demand high-tech sector DJ 40
Effectivity of imitation effort low-tech sector aimI 0.02
Effectivity of innovation effort low-tech sector aimI 0.007
Effectivity of effort high-tech sector aim,inJ 1.2·a
im,in
I
Effectivity of effort low-tech sector bRDI 0.002
Effectivity of effort high-tech sector bRDJ 1.2·b
RD
I
Adaptation speed for sector-specific credit due to survival rates aλ 0.5
Adaptation speed for sector-specific credit due to technol. change bλ 0.25
initial no. of firms 10
initial capital K0it 100
initial technology A0it 0.15
interest rate i 0.05
initial R&D spending desire Φ0it 0.004
firms’ R&D adjustment policy parameter λ F 2
depreciation rate δ 0.03
production costs c 0.16
lower capital barrier for bankruptcy crit 1
time horizon for profit history T 3
time horizon for productivity history H 20
markup parameter for investment desire ϕ 3
parameter for scoring points ξ 400
Control Parameters - basic values
average credit supply in unit of capital lst 0.05
bank’s weighing parameter for credit offer λ 0.375
Robustness Check
In order to check whether the results are robust, a Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is
conducted. The Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is performed because it allows for testing samples
where a normal distribution cannot be assumed and where the variance is unknown. It is a
non parametric test. The following procedure is as described by Sheskin.5 Basically, the test
is whether the medians of two sample populations (data sets) are likely to be the same at a
5See Sheskin 2011, pp. 245 ff.
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certain level of significance. If so, the two sample populations can be assumed to be drawn
from the same distribution. Some assumptions are essential for the test:
1. The observed data either constitute a random sample of N independent pairs of items.
2. The observed data are measured at a higher level than the ordinal scale.
3. The distribution of the population of difference scores between repeated measurements
of between matched items of individuals is approximately symmetric.
The Null-hypothesis is that the two populations which the results stem from do not differ in
their median ν : H0 : ν1 = ν2 while the alternative is for a two tailed test Halt : ν1 6= ν2. that
is, the median of population 2 is either below or above the median of population 1. The
results are checked for a significance level of 95%, that is α = 0.05. Each pair of data is
compared and the difference taken Wi = x1i− x2i for all i = 1, ...,N. Zero differences Wi = 0
are discarded and the sample size left is n. Since a two tailed test is conducted, the test
statistics is the minimum of the sums of negative and positive differences in the pairs of the
samples,
W := Min[|W−|,W+].
If the sample size is sufficiently large, W can be assumed to be normally distributed. Then, a
z-value can be computed using the number of nonzero differences n. This can also be done
for the continuation of data in order to better compare the continuous normal distribution
with discrete data in the form
z =
∣∣∣W − n(n+1)4
∣∣∣−0.5√
n(n+1)(2n+1)
24
.
In this test, the H0 hypothesis can be rejected if |z| ≥ z
crit where zcrit is the critical value at
a significance level chosen according to a table. For a significance level α = 0.05 the critical
value is zcrit = 1.645.
The intervals that the parameters for the test are chosen from are: The following tables
depict the result of the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test for 100 random samples of above param-
eter space. If the Null Hypothesis cannot be rejected, ′′ns′′ is depicted. If it can be rejected,
then the direction of difference between sample medians is shown. Where ∗ is depicted,
there is no debt to be repaid because credit supply is zero and thus there is no test for that
particular case.
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δ ∈ [0.027,0.033]
c ∈ [0.144,0.176]
aimI ∈ [0.018,0.022]
ainI ∈ [0.0063,0.0077]
bRDI ∈ [0.0018,0.0022]
aimJ ∈ [0.0216,0.0264]
ainJ ∈ [0.00756,0.00924]
bRDJ ∈ [0.00216,0.00264]
ϕ ∈ [2.7,3.3]
λ F ∈ [1.8,2.2]
aλ ∈ [0.45,0.55]
bλ ∈ [1.8,2.2]
DI ∈ [35,45]
DJ ∈ [35,45]
λ sini ∈ [0.45,0.55]
Table 1: Parameter space for the robustness check
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Low Tech Sector
credit supply output. credit surpl.
λ = 0 vs. λ = 0.5
bλ = 0 ns ns
bλ = 0.25 < <
bλ = 0.5 < <
λ = 0.5 vs. λ = 1
bλ = 0 < <
bλ = 0.25 ns <
bλ = 0.5 ns <
λ = 0 vs. λ = 1
bλ = 0 < <
bλ = 0.25 < <
bλ = 0.5 < <
High Tech Sector
credit supply output credit surpl.
λ = 0 vs. λ = 0.5
bλ = 0 ns ns
bλ = 0.25 < <
bλ = 0.5 ns ns
λ = 0.5 vs. λ = 1
bλ = 0 < <
bλ = 0.25 ns <
bλ = 0.5 ns <
λ = 0 vs. λ = 1
bλ = 0 < <
bλ = 0.25 < <
bλ = 0.5 < ns
Table 2: Results of the Wilcoxon-Signed-Rank Test for the bank policy
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Low Tech Sector
credit supply output credit surpl. λ s(both sectors)
βg = −1 vs. βg = 0
bλ = 0 ns ns ns
bλ = 0.25 ns ns ns
bλ = 0.5 ns ns ns
βg = 0 vs. βg = 2
bλ = 0 ns ns ns
bλ = 0.25 ns ns ns
bλ = 0.5 ns ns ns
βg = −1 vs. βg = 2
bλ = 0 ns ns ns
bλ = 0.25 > ns ns
bλ = 0.5 ns ns ns
High Tech Sector
credit supply output credit surpl.
βg = −1 vs. βg = 0
bλ = 0 ns ns
bλ = 0.25 ns ns
bλ = 0.5 ns ns
βg = 0 vs. βg = 2
bλ = 0 ns <
bλ = 0.25 ns ns
bλ = 0.5 ns ns
βg = −1 vs. βg = 2
bλ = 0 ns ns
bλ = 0.25 ns ns
bλ = 0.5 ns ns
Table 3: Results of the Wilcoxon-Signed-Rank Test for the expectation formation
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